This note documents detection patterns related to Local System Enumeration within Windows environments.
Direct Indicators
| Log | Event ID | Meaning | Forensic Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security | 4688 | Process creation | Critical | Detects enumeration binaries and command lines. |
| Sysmon | 1 | Process creation | Critical | Best source for enumeration lineage and hashes. |
| Sysmon | 11 | File create | Medium | Output files created during scripted enumeration. |
| PowerShell | 4104 | Script block logging | Critical | Captures PowerShell-based local recon. |
| Sysmon | 3 | Network connection | Medium | Useful if local recon followed by external reporting. |
| Sysmon | 22 | DNS query | Low | Rarely needed unless tool reaches external host. |
Indirect Indicators
| Indicator | What To Look For | Forensic Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst of native recon commands | whoami, hostname, systeminfo, tasklist | Critical | Common first-stage operator behavior. |
| Privilege checks | whoami /priv /groups | Critical | Often precedes escalation. |
| Service / process listing | tasklist, sc query | High | Local target mapping. |
| Patch enumeration | systeminfo, wmic qfe | High | Privesc preparation. |
| Local user/group inspection | net user, net localgroup | High | Privilege mapping. |
| Scripted recon bundle | Many commands in short span | Critical | Strong operator automation clue. |
Common Tools
| Tool | Usage |
|---|---|
| whoami.exe | Identity / privileges |
| hostname.exe | Host identification |
| systeminfo.exe | System details / patch level |
| tasklist.exe | Process listing |
| net.exe | User / group enumeration |
| sc.exe | Service inspection |
| wmic.exe | OS / patch / hardware info |
| PowerShell | Full local recon |
Relevant Artifacts
- Security Event ID 4688
- Sysmon Event ID 1
- Sysmon Event ID 11
- PowerShell 4104
- Prefetch:
WHOAMI.EXESYSTEMINFO.EXETASKLIST.EXENET.EXEWMIC.EXE
- Amcache / ShimCache
- MFT / USN if outputs written
- EDR process tree
MITRE ATT&CK References
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1007 System Service Discovery
Decision Tree
-
Which recon command executed?
- Single command
- Burst sequence
-
Parent process suspicious?
- Shell
- PowerShell
- Remote execution source
-
Output captured?
- Redirected file
- Clipboard
- Archive
-
Follow-up activity?
- Privilege escalation
- Credential access
- Lateral movement
-
Expand:
- Adjacent recon
- Network recon
- Persistence setup
-
Scope:
- Single host recon
- Automated toolkit
- Multi-host spread
Example Detection Templates
KQL
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where NewProcessName has_any ("whoami.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","hostname.exe","net.exe","wmic.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, CommandLine
Sysmon
| where EventID == 1
| where Image has_any ("\\whoami.exe","\\systeminfo.exe","\\tasklist.exe","\\net.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Image, ParentImage
EQL
process where process.name in ("whoami.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","hostname.exe","net.exe","wmic.exe")
sequence by host.name with maxspan=3m
[ process where process.name == "whoami.exe" ]
[ process where process.name == "systeminfo.exe" ]
Sigma
title: Local System Enumeration Detection
id: 4c7e2a91-local-enum
status: experimental
description: Detects common local reconnaissance commands
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Vergil
date: 2026-03-07
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
NewProcessName|endswith:
- '\whoami.exe'
- '\systeminfo.exe'
- '\tasklist.exe'
- '\hostname.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
condition: selection
fields:
- NewProcessName
- CommandLine
falsepositives:
- Administrative diagnostics
level: medium
tags:
- attack.discovery
Mitigation & Hardening
| Control Area | Mitigation | Effectiveness | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Process monitoring | Alert on recon bursts | Critical | Strong early signal |
| Parent-child analysis | Identify remote source | High | Distinguish admin vs attacker |
| PowerShell logging | Capture scripted recon | High | Strong visibility |
| Baseline admin tools | Know normal usage | High | Reduce false positives |
| EDR sequence analytics | Detect recon chains | Critical | Better than single-command alerts |