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BLUE TEAM / THREAT HUNT / WINDOWS / AUTHENTICATION

Logins

This note documents detection patterns related to Logins within Windows environments.


Direct Indicators

LogEvent IDMeaningForensic ValueNotes
Security4624Successful logonCriticalCore event for successful authentication.
Security4625Failed logonCriticalPassword guessing, invalid credentials, blocked access.
Security4634LogoffHighSession closure timing.
Security4647User initiated logoffMediumExplicit user logoff.
Security4648Logon using explicit credentialsCriticalStrong lateral movement clue.
Security4672Special privileges assignedCriticalElevated session indicator.
Security4776NTLM authenticationHighLocal/DC credential validation.
Security4768Kerberos TGT requestedCriticalDomain login start.
Security4769Kerberos service ticket requestedCriticalService access after authentication.

Indirect Indicators

IndicatorWhat To Look ForForensic ValueNotes
Unusual logon typeType 3 / 10 / 9 at odd timeCriticalRemote access clue.
New source hostFirst-seen workstation/serverCriticalStrong anomaly.
Burst of failures then successBrute force / password sprayCriticalStrong compromise pattern.
Explicit creds before admin action4648 before lateral movementCriticalOperator behavior.
Privileged login on workstationAdmin token on non-admin hostCriticalHigh-value clue.
Service account interactive loginRare behaviorHighPossible abuse.

Common Tools

ToolUsage
RDPInteractive remote login
runas.exeExplicit credentials
PsExecRemote logon chain
PowerShell remotingRemote auth
SMBNetwork logon
WinRMRemote admin

Relevant Artifacts

  • Security Event IDs 4624, 4625, 4634, 4647, 4648, 4672, 4776, 4768, 4769
  • Logon types:
    • 2 Interactive
    • 3 Network
    • 4 Batch
    • 5 Service
    • 7 Unlock
    • 8 NetworkCleartext
    • 9 NewCredentials
    • 10 RemoteInteractive
  • Source IP / workstation name
  • LUID correlation
  • EDR session telemetry

MITRE ATT&CK References

  • T1078 Valid Accounts
  • T1021 Remote Services
  • T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material

Decision Tree

  1. Success or failure?

    • 4624
    • 4625
  2. Logon type?

    • Interactive
    • Network
    • RDP
    • NewCredentials
  3. Source expected?

    • Known host
    • New host
    • External pivot
  4. Elevated?

    • 4672 present
    • Admin account
  5. Follow-up activity?

    • Process creation
    • Enumeration
    • Lateral movement
  6. Scope:

    • Single login
    • Spray
    • Multi-host spread

Example Detection Templates

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID in (4624,4625,4648,4672)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IpAddress, LogonType, EventID
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4625
| summarize count() by IpAddress, Account
| where count_ > 5

EQL

authentication where event.code in ("4624","4625","4648")
sequence by source.ip with maxspan=10m
  [ authentication where event.code == "4625" ]
  [ authentication where event.code == "4624" ]

Sigma

title: Suspicious Login Detection
id: 8c4f1a23-logins
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious authentication activity
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Vergil
date: 2026-03-07
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4624
      - 4625
      - 4648
      - 4672
  condition: selection
fields:
  - EventID
  - Account
  - IpAddress
  - LogonType
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administration
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.lateral_movement

Mitigation & Hardening

Control AreaMitigationEffectivenessNotes
Alert on unusual logon typePrioritize 3 / 9 / 10CriticalStrong signal
Correlate failures and successDetect spraysCriticalHigh-value pattern
Baseline source hostsDetect new originsHighStrong anomaly
Protect privileged accountsMonitor 4672 closelyCriticalHigh-risk sessions
Retain full auth chainPreserve LUID contextHighEssential for timeline