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BLUE TEAM / THREAT HUNT / ACTIVE DIRECTORY / RELAY ATTACKS

SMB Relay

This note documents detection patterns related to SMB Relay within Active Directory environments.


Direct Indicators

LogEvent IDMeaningForensic ValueNotes
Security4624Successful logonHighNTLM authentication relayed to SMB service.
Security4672Special privileges assignedHighPrivileged account authenticated via relay.
Security5140Network share accessedHighADMIN$ or C$ shares accessed via relayed authentication.
Security7045Service installedCriticalRemote service created after successful relay.
Sysmon3Network connectionHighSMB connections between attacker and victim host.

Indirect Indicators

IndicatorWhat To Look ForForensic ValueNotes
NTLM authentication spikesMultiple NTLM logons in short timeHighRelay attempts or coercion.
ADMIN$ share accessRemote administrative share usageHighCommon relay exploitation path.
Service creation after authenticationService installed following NTLM loginCriticalOften used to execute payload.
Machine account authenticationComputer accounts authenticating unexpectedlyMediumMay indicate coerced relay chain.

Common Tools

ToolUsage
Impacket ntlmrelayxRelays captured NTLM authentication to SMB services.
ResponderCaptures NTLM authentication via LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning.
CrackMapExecAutomates SMB relay attacks.
Metasploit SMB relay modulesUsed for lateral movement via relay.

Relevant Artifacts

  • Security logs (4624, 4672, 5140, 7045)
  • SMB network traffic
  • Sysmon network events
  • EDR telemetry
  • Service creation artifacts
  • Share access logs

MITRE ATT&CK References

  • T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
  • T1557.001 NTLM Relay
  • T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Decision Tree

  1. Detect NTLM authentication to SMB.
  2. Identify source host initiating relay.
  3. Inspect accessed shares (ADMIN$, C$).
  4. Check for service installation or command execution.
  5. Determine lateral movement or privilege escalation.

Example Detection Templates

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID in (4624,5140,7045)

EQL

network where destination.port == 445

Sigma

title: SMB Relay Activity
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID:
      - 4624
      - 5140
      - 7045
  condition: selection
level: high

Mitigation & Hardening

Control AreaMitigationEffectivenessNotes
SMB signingRequire SMB signingCriticalPrevents NTLM relay attacks.
NTLM restrictionsDisable or restrict NTLM authenticationHighReduces relay attack surface.
Network segmentationRestrict SMB communicationMediumLimits lateral movement.
MonitoringAlert on unusual NTLM authenticationHighDetects relay activity.