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BLUE TEAM / THREAT HUNT / ACTIVE DIRECTORY / GPO

Creation Abuse

This note documents detection patterns related to GPO Creation Abuse within Active Directory environments.


Direct Indicators

LogEvent IDMeaningForensic ValueNotes
Security5137Directory object createdCriticalNew GPO object created.
Security5136Directory object modifiedHighNew GPO attributes configured.
Security5145Network share accessedMediumSYSVOL policy directory created.

Indirect Indicators

IndicatorWhat To Look ForForensic ValueNotes
New policy GUID folderNew directory under SYSVOL PoliciesCriticalIndicates new GPO.
Immediate policy linkingPolicy linked to domain or OU quicklyHighSuspicious deployment.
Scripts inside new GPOStartup or logon scripts addedCriticalPayload delivery mechanism.

Common Tools

ToolUsage
SharpGPOAbuseCreates malicious GPO.
PowerShellNew-GPO command abuse.
PowerViewPolicy enumeration and manipulation.

Relevant Artifacts

  • SYSVOL Policies directory
  • GPT.ini
  • Policy scripts
  • Security logs
  • EDR telemetry

MITRE ATT&CK References

  • T1484 Domain Policy Modification

Decision Tree

  1. Identify GPO creation event.
  2. Determine creator account.
  3. Inspect SYSVOL directory for payload.
  4. Check policy links.
  5. Identify impacted systems.

Example Detection Templates

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5137

EQL

any where event.code == "5137"

Sigma

title: New GPO Created
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5137
  condition: selection
level: medium

Mitigation & Hardening

Control AreaMitigationEffectivenessNotes
PermissionsLimit who can create GPOsCriticalReduces attack surface.
MonitoringAlert on GPO creationHighDetects persistence attempts.