This note documents detection patterns related to ADCS ESC10 within Active Directory environments.
Direct Indicators
| Log | Event ID | Meaning | Forensic Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security | 4886 | Certificate issued | Critical | ESC10 exploitation results in certificate issuance using templates allowing impersonation through certificate mapping weaknesses. |
| Security | 4887 | Certificate request approved | Medium | Suspicious approval events may accompany certificate abuse. |
| Security | 4768 | Kerberos TGT request | Critical | Certificates obtained via ESC10 are commonly used for PKINIT authentication. |
| Security | 4624 | Successful logon | High | Certificate-based authentication events occurring after certificate issuance. |
| Security | 4672 | Special privileges assigned | High | Privileged session following certificate authentication. |
| Sysmon | 1 | Process creation | Medium | Execution of tools such as Certipy, Certify, or Rubeus interacting with ADCS. |
| Sysmon | 3 | Network connection | Medium | Connections to CA servers or domain controllers. |
Indirect Indicators
| Indicator | What To Look For | Forensic Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weak certificate mapping configuration | Templates allowing authentication without strict identity binding | Critical | ESC10 relies on improper mapping between certificate subject and user account. |
| Certificate issued for identity mismatch | SubjectUserName differs from Requester | Critical | Indicates impersonation attempt. |
| PKINIT authentication shortly after enrollment | TGT request following certificate issuance | High | Indicates certificate authentication. |
| Authentication from unusual host | Account authenticating from previously unseen workstation | High | Possible attacker host. |
| Administrative actions after certificate authentication | ACL modifications, account changes | Critical | Indicates attacker escalation after authentication. |
Common Tools
| Tool | Usage |
|---|---|
| Certipy | Enumerates and exploits ESC10 misconfigurations. |
| Certify | Requests certificates from vulnerable templates. |
| Rubeus | Uses certificates for Kerberos authentication via PKINIT. |
| ForgeCert | Creates forged certificates when CA keys are compromised. |
| Impacket | Supports certificate-based authentication operations. |
Relevant Artifacts
- Domain controller Security logs (4768, 4624, 4672)
- ADCS server Security logs (4886, 4887)
- Certificate Authority database
- Certificate template configuration
- Sysmon logs (1, 3)
- PKINIT authentication logs
- EDR telemetry detecting certificate abuse tools
- Prefetch artifacts showing Certipy or Certify execution
MITRE ATT&CK References
- T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- T1078 Valid Accounts
Decision Tree
- Is the suspicious event present?
- Identify certificate issuance events 4886 for sensitive templates.
- What host generated the event?
- Determine system requesting certificate from CA.
- Is the account expected to perform this action?
- Investigate mismatches between Requester and SubjectUserName.
- Pivot:
- Source host → inspect execution of Certipy or Certify.
- Account → review authentication method used after certificate issuance.
- Network → inspect PKINIT authentication activity.
- Confirm exploitation
- Determine whether certificate allowed authentication as another identity.
Example Detection Templates
KQL
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4886
| summarize count() by CertificateTemplate, Requester, SubjectUserName, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4768
| summarize count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
EQL
any where event.code == "4886"
Sigma
title: Suspicious ADCS Certificate Issuance ESC10
id: adcs-esc10-detection
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious certificate issuance potentially related to ESC10 exploitation
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4886
condition: selection
fields:
- CertificateTemplate
- Requester
- SubjectUserName
falsepositives:
- Legitimate certificate enrollment
level: medium
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1649
Mitigation & Hardening
| Control Area | Mitigation | Effectiveness | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strict certificate mapping | Require strong identity binding between certificates and accounts | Critical | Prevents impersonation attacks. |
| Template security review | Audit certificate templates for authentication permissions | High | Detects vulnerable configurations. |
| Enrollment restrictions | Limit enrollment rights for sensitive templates | High | Reduces attack surface. |
| Monitoring | Alert on certificate issuance for privileged identities | High | Early detection. |
| PKI hardening | Restrict administrative access to ADCS infrastructure | High | Protects certificate services. |