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BLUE TEAM / THREAT HUNT / ACTIVE DIRECTORY / ADCS

ESC10

This note documents detection patterns related to ADCS ESC10 within Active Directory environments.


Direct Indicators

LogEvent IDMeaningForensic ValueNotes
Security4886Certificate issuedCriticalESC10 exploitation results in certificate issuance using templates allowing impersonation through certificate mapping weaknesses.
Security4887Certificate request approvedMediumSuspicious approval events may accompany certificate abuse.
Security4768Kerberos TGT requestCriticalCertificates obtained via ESC10 are commonly used for PKINIT authentication.
Security4624Successful logonHighCertificate-based authentication events occurring after certificate issuance.
Security4672Special privileges assignedHighPrivileged session following certificate authentication.
Sysmon1Process creationMediumExecution of tools such as Certipy, Certify, or Rubeus interacting with ADCS.
Sysmon3Network connectionMediumConnections to CA servers or domain controllers.

Indirect Indicators

IndicatorWhat To Look ForForensic ValueNotes
Weak certificate mapping configurationTemplates allowing authentication without strict identity bindingCriticalESC10 relies on improper mapping between certificate subject and user account.
Certificate issued for identity mismatchSubjectUserName differs from RequesterCriticalIndicates impersonation attempt.
PKINIT authentication shortly after enrollmentTGT request following certificate issuanceHighIndicates certificate authentication.
Authentication from unusual hostAccount authenticating from previously unseen workstationHighPossible attacker host.
Administrative actions after certificate authenticationACL modifications, account changesCriticalIndicates attacker escalation after authentication.

Common Tools

ToolUsage
CertipyEnumerates and exploits ESC10 misconfigurations.
CertifyRequests certificates from vulnerable templates.
RubeusUses certificates for Kerberos authentication via PKINIT.
ForgeCertCreates forged certificates when CA keys are compromised.
ImpacketSupports certificate-based authentication operations.

Relevant Artifacts

  • Domain controller Security logs (4768, 4624, 4672)
  • ADCS server Security logs (4886, 4887)
  • Certificate Authority database
  • Certificate template configuration
  • Sysmon logs (1, 3)
  • PKINIT authentication logs
  • EDR telemetry detecting certificate abuse tools
  • Prefetch artifacts showing Certipy or Certify execution

MITRE ATT&CK References

  • T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
  • T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
  • T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
  • T1078 Valid Accounts

Decision Tree

  1. Is the suspicious event present?
    • Identify certificate issuance events 4886 for sensitive templates.
  2. What host generated the event?
    • Determine system requesting certificate from CA.
  3. Is the account expected to perform this action?
    • Investigate mismatches between Requester and SubjectUserName.
  4. Pivot:
    • Source host → inspect execution of Certipy or Certify.
    • Account → review authentication method used after certificate issuance.
    • Network → inspect PKINIT authentication activity.
  5. Confirm exploitation
    • Determine whether certificate allowed authentication as another identity.

Example Detection Templates

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4886
| summarize count() by CertificateTemplate, Requester, SubjectUserName, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4768
| summarize count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)

EQL

any where event.code == "4886"

Sigma

title: Suspicious ADCS Certificate Issuance ESC10
id: adcs-esc10-detection
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious certificate issuance potentially related to ESC10 exploitation
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4886
  condition: selection
fields:
  - CertificateTemplate
  - Requester
  - SubjectUserName
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate certificate enrollment
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1649

Mitigation & Hardening

Control AreaMitigationEffectivenessNotes
Strict certificate mappingRequire strong identity binding between certificates and accountsCriticalPrevents impersonation attacks.
Template security reviewAudit certificate templates for authentication permissionsHighDetects vulnerable configurations.
Enrollment restrictionsLimit enrollment rights for sensitive templatesHighReduces attack surface.
MonitoringAlert on certificate issuance for privileged identitiesHighEarly detection.
PKI hardeningRestrict administrative access to ADCS infrastructureHighProtects certificate services.