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BLUE TEAM / THREAT HUNT / ACTIVE DIRECTORY / ACL

GenericAll

This note documents detection patterns related to GenericAll Abuse within Active Directory environments.


Direct Indicators

LogEvent IDMeaningForensic ValueNotes
Security5136Directory object modifiedCriticalGenericAll allows full control over an AD object. Look for attribute modifications such as member, servicePrincipalName, or userAccountControl.
Security4728Member added to security-enabled global groupCriticalAttacker may add themselves to privileged groups like Domain Admins.
Security4732Member added to security-enabled local groupHighUsed for privilege escalation through local group membership.
Security4742Computer account changedHighAttackers may modify computer objects for delegation abuse.
Security4724Password reset attemptHighGenericAll allows password reset for user objects.
Sysmon1Process creationMediumExecution of tools such as PowerView, BloodHound, or Impacket performing AD modifications.
Sysmon3Network connectionMediumConnections to domain controllers performing LDAP modifications.
Security4738A user account was changedHighPrimary Indicator of user changes.

Indirect Indicators

IndicatorWhat To Look ForForensic ValueNotes
Unexpected privilege escalationAccount added to administrative group unexpectedlyCriticalClassic outcome of GenericAll abuse.
Attribute modification on sensitive objectsChanges to admin accounts, service accounts, or DC objectsHighIndicates potential takeover attempt.
Password reset events without helpdesk activityUnexpected password reset on privileged accountCriticalGenericAll allows resetting passwords directly.
Delegation changes on computer objectsModification of SPNs or delegation attributesHighMay lead to Kerberos abuse attacks.
Multiple AD object modifications in short timeRapid changes across directory objectsMediumIndicates attacker performing privilege escalation chain.

Common Tools

ToolUsage
PowerViewModifies AD objects using GenericAll permissions.
BloodHoundIdentifies attack paths including GenericAll privileges.
ImpacketLDAP modification modules used for privilege escalation.
SharpHoundCollects AD relationship data for privilege path discovery.
ADSIEdit / LDAP toolsUsed to modify directory objects directly.

Relevant Artifacts

  • Domain controller Security logs (5136, 4728, 4732, 4724)
  • LDAP modification logs
  • Active Directory object metadata
  • Sysmon logs (1, 3)
  • EDR telemetry identifying AD manipulation tools
  • Directory replication metadata
  • Prefetch artifacts showing execution of PowerView or Impacket tools

MITRE ATT&CK References

  • T1098 Account Manipulation
  • T1484 Domain Policy Modification
  • T1078 Valid Accounts

Decision Tree

  1. Is the suspicious event present?
    • Identify directory object modification (5136) or group membership changes.
  2. What host generated the event?
    • Determine workstation performing LDAP modifications.
  3. Is the account expected to perform this action?
    • Investigate whether account normally manages directory objects.
  4. Pivot:
    • Source host → inspect execution of PowerView or Impacket tools.
    • Account → review privileges and group memberships.
    • Network → analyze LDAP traffic patterns.
  5. Confirm exploitation
    • Determine whether attacker used GenericAll permission to escalate privileges.

Example Detection Templates

KQL

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4728 or EventID == 4732
| project TimeGenerated, TargetUserName, SubjectUserName
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, ObjectDN

EQL

any where event.code == "5136"

Sigma

title: Suspicious Active Directory Object Modification
id: genericall-abuse-detection
status: experimental
description: Detects directory object modifications potentially indicating GenericAll abuse
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5136
  condition: selection
fields:
  - SubjectUserName
  - ObjectDN
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative directory modifications
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1098

Mitigation & Hardening

Control AreaMitigationEffectivenessNotes
Privilege reviewAudit AD ACLs for GenericAll permissionsCriticalRemoves unnecessary full control rights.
Least privilegeRestrict directory modification privilegesHighReduces escalation opportunities.
MonitoringAlert on group membership changesHighDetects privilege escalation attempts.
AD security reviewRegularly review delegation permissionsHighIdentifies risky configurations.
Change managementRequire approval for sensitive directory changesMediumReduces unauthorized modifications.